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HEALTH MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC. V SIEGEL'
(decided April 25, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a 4-3 decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that an
officer or director could not recover fees incurred while seeking
indemnification for defending a derivative lawsuit in his corporate
capacity absent a showing that the company disputed the indemnifi-
cation claim in bad faith. The court relied on New York Business
Corporation Laws (NYBCL) §§ 722-724 and the legislative history
behind Business Corporation Law Article 7, which suggests that the
statutes were not intended to go beyond the common law agency
rule on indemnification. 2 The common law rule (American Rule)




The appellant, Phillip Siegel, Chief Financial Officer of Health
Management Systems (HMS), was joined as a party defendant in
several securities fraud suits brought against HMS in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 4 Rather
than rely on legal representation provided by the company, Siegel
hired his own attorney because his situation was different from
other officers and directors of the company who were joined as co-
defendants. 5 Siegel believed he was less culpable for any wrongdo-
ing because he joined HMS three months after the alleged fraud
began, and unlike other officers who sold their HMS stock at a
profit, Siegel purchased HMS stock at the allegedly inflated price. 6
Siegel submitted a written request for indemnification to HMS
after all claims against him were dismissed. However, HMS denied
his request on the ground that separate counsel was not reasonable
1. 98 N.Y.2d 80 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id at 88.
4. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Lit., 82 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
5. Id at 232.
6. Id at 232.
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
or necessary. 7 Siegel then filed a motion in district court, pursuant
to NYBCL § 724 and HMS by-laws, for indemnification of
$67,636.73 incurred in legal fees and expenses8 and for reimburse-
ment of $17,147.64 incurred while attempting to secure indemnifi-
cation or fees on fees.9 In addition to citing statutory authority and
HMS by-laws, Siegel argued that HMS should be liable for fees on
fees because the company acted in bad faith when opposing indem-
nification. 10 A bad faith exception to the American Rule permits a
court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party when
the losing party has acted in bad faith." The standard of proof
required is extremely high, requiring clear evidence that the chal-
lenged actions are entirely without color and a high degree of spec-
ificity in the factual findings of the court.
12
HMS opposed Siegel's motion, claiming that Siegel did not re-
quire separate counsel.13 HMS offered Siegel $5,000.00 to cover his
expenses.1 4 Upon request by HMS counsel, the district court re-
ferred Siegel's motion to a United States magistrate judge.
After months of discovery battles, HMS conceded that Siegel
was probably entitled to more than $5,000.00, and the United
States magistrate judge recommended that Siegel recover the fees
for his independent representation in the securities class action
sUitS. 15 However, the magistrate judge rejected Siegel's request for
recovery of fees on fees on the grounds that the general rule in New
York was that "attorneys' fees may not be awarded unless there is
specific statutory or contractual authorization." 16 The district court
adopted the magistrate's findings on this point and rejected
Siegel's argument that HMS acted in bad faith. 17 The district court
admitted that the issue of HMS's bad faith was "regrettably a very
7. Baker v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 264 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
8. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Lit., 82 F.Supp.2d 227.
9. Id.
10. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Lit., 82 F.Supp.2d 227.
11. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986).
12. Id.
13. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 83.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Hooper Assoc., Ltd. V. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 491
(1989)).
17. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Lit., 82 F.Supp.2d 227.
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close call.""' However, the court cited HMS's decision to concede
that Siegel did need to have individual representation as proof that
bad faith was not present.19 Siegel appealed the decision to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit reviewed the findings of the district court
using a de novo standard of review. Having found that the district
court did not err in applying the law, the Second Circuit upheld the
lower court's ruling that HMS did not act in bad faith; therefore,
fees on fees could not be awarded on those grounds. 20 However,
the court determined that a question existed as to whether NYBCL
§§ 722-724 authorized reimbursement for fees incurred in litigat-
ing the right to indemnification, absent a showing of bad faith. Be-
cause the outcome of the case required interpretation of NYBCL
Article 7 and the New York Court of Appeals had not yet deter-
mined the scope of the statute, the Second Circuit certified the is-
sue to the state court. When faced with a state law question, federal
courts defer to state court interpretation either by relying on state
court precedent or by certifying the issue to the state court to re-
solve. With no clear precedent to rely on, the Second Circuit asked
the New York Court of Appeals to interpret the statutory scope of
NYBCL Article 7.
The Second Circuit presented the following certified question
to the New York Court of Appeals: Where a corporate officer suc-
cessfully defends an underlying action, within the meaning of
NYBCL § 723(a) and where there is no bad faith on the part of the
corporation, does the phrase "attorneys' fees actually and necessa-
rily incurred as a result of such action or proceeding," as used in
NYBCL § 7 22(a), provide for recovery of reasonable fees incurred
by the officer in attempting to secure indemnification?
21
III. DISCUSSION
The Court of Appeals answered the Second Circuit's question
in the negative. The court's analysis included examining the legis-
lative intent of NYBCL Article 7 and the American rule regarding
18. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Lit., 82 F.Supp.2d 231.
19. Id.
20. Baker, 264 F.3d 154.
21. Id. at 146.
2003]
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indemnification of attorneys' fees.22 Relying on United States Su-
preme Court case law23 and New York case law, 24 the court held
that it was a general common law practice not to award attorney's
fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.
25
Siegel argued that NYBCL Article 7 was "a remedial statute
with the purpose of shifting all costs and personal liability away
from a corporate official sued in that capacity." 26 Therefore, the
statue should be read expansively. Siegel suggested that a "but for"
test should have been applied pursuant to NYBCL § 722(a), enti-
ling him to reimbursement of all fees that he would not have spent
had he not been made a party to the securities fraud suit.2 7 The
court, however, disagreed.
The majority read NYBCL § 722(a) very narrowly and held that
recovery of fees is limited to only those expenses that were "actually
and necessarily incurred as a result of an action or proceeding."
28
In other words, there must have been a substantial nexus between
the expenses and the underlying suit.29 The court viewed reim-
bursement of fees on fees as an attenuated link to the underlying




The court performed an expansive review of the legislative his-
tory of NYBCL Article 7.31 The court determined that the legisla-
tive objective was to apply indemnification principles, similar to
those of common law agency rules, in the context of suits against
corporate officials based on their conduct undertaken "in the good
faith belief that they were acting properly in the best interests of the
corporation. '3 2 The court emphasized the fact that the New York
legislature revised Article 7 numerous times, but never changed the
22. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 80.
23. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Res.,
532 US 598, 602 (2001).
24. Hooper Assoc., Ltd. V AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1989).
25. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 88.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id. at 85.
28. Id. See also NYBCL § 722(a) (McKinney 2001).
29. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 85.
30. Id at 87.
31. Id at 86-7.
32. Id at 86.
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operative language in question. 33 Furthermore, the legislature ex-
amined several state statues similar to NYBCL Article 734 to aid
them in drafting the indemnification provisions, including state
statutes with provisions expressly authorizing the recovery of fees
incurred to enforce indemnification rights; however, the legislature
chose not to include similar provisions in NYBCL Article 7.35
The court did not only rely on legislative history to interpret
NYBCL Article 7; they also relied on the common law American
Rule of indemnification. 36 The American Rule recognizes attor-
ney's fees as an incident of litigation, and prohibits a prevailing
party from collecting such fees unless an award is authorized by a
contract, statute or court order (i.e., in instances where bad faith is
found.)3 7 The Court emphasized previous cases decided by both
the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court where the courts held that absent explicit statutory provision,
enforcement fees were not to be awarded and statutory provisions
must be strictly construed. 38 However, none of the precedent cited
interpreted the scope of Article 7. Rather, the cases dealt with in-
demnification disputes arising from contractual provisions.3
9
The court noted that its ruling did not leave corporate officials,
like Siegel, without indemnification protection. Citing NYBCL
§ 721, the court stated that Article 7 was not an exclusive remedy
and that "corporations remain free to provide indemnification of
fees on fees in corporate by-laws, employment contracts or through
insurance. ''4
0
In dissent, Chief Justice Judith Kaye argued that the phrase
"fees reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of such action
33. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d at 87.
34. Id at 87. (citing California Business Corporation Law § 317(a) and Indiana
Code Annotated § 23-1-37-11).
35. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 87. (citing Bill Jacket, L 1987, ch 367, at 16;
Governer's Program Bill, Bill Jacket, L 1986, ch 513, at 11-12).
36. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 88.
37. Id. (citing Hooper Assoc., Ltd. v. AGS Computers, 74 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1989)).
38. Id. See also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001); Hooper Assoc., Ltd. V. AGS Computers, Inc., 74
N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1989); Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 267 (1954).
39. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001); HooperAssoc., Ltd. V. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487,
491 (1989); Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 267 (1954).
40. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 88.
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or proceeding" should have been more liberally construed to in-
clude fees incurred in an indemnification recovery proceeding
against a corporation.41 Citing prior New York case law where
courts provided for reasonable enforcement fees, 4 2 the dissent
pointed out that the facts of the case did not raise concerns of cov-
ering expenses far removed from the underlying action, as the ma-
jority suggested. 43 Rather, enforcement was necessary after years of
court battles over indemnification fees.44
The dissent stressed that there was no clear legislative history
and attempted to discredit the precedent cited by the majority.
45
Kaye noted that the cases most heavily relied upon by the majority
were cases dealing with contractual indemnification provisions, not
statutory interpretation of Article 7.46
Kaye's dissenting opinion further criticized the lower court's
determination that HMS did not act in bad faith. According to
Judge Kaye, not only did the court's decision give defendant com-
panies considerable leverage "in keeping individual directors in the
fold of a common defense on pain of paying their own legal ex-
penses if they seek to assert meritorious separate defenses," but it




In Health Management Systems, Inc. v. Siegel, the New York Court
of Appeals held that New York Business Corporation Law §§ 722-
724 does not provide for the recovery of fees incurred by a corpo-
rate officer or director in obtaining indemnification. 48 The court
held that NYBCL §§ 722-724 lacked the explicit statutory authority
41. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d at 89.
42. See Prof. Ins. Co. of New York v. Barry, 303 N.Y.S.2d 556, affd. 302 N.Y.S.2d 722
(1st Dept. 1969); Sierra Rutile Ltd. v. Katz, 1997 WL 431119 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).




47. Id at 90.
48. Id at 88.
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necessary to permit the recovery of such fees due to the longstand-
ing American rule that each party pays its own legal fees.49
Melissa Beck
49. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 88.
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